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WHY THE NORTH DAKOTA PUBLICLY TRADED 
CORPORATIONS ACT WILL FAIL 
STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE* 
 
Most commentators believe that states compete in granting corporate 
charters.  After all, the more charters (certificates of incorporation) the state 
grants, the more franchise and other taxes it collects.  This competition can 
take a number of forms.  The state can offer such inducements as attractive 
tax treatment, a dedicated business law court, and statutes whose terms are 
attractive to the relevant decision maker. 
Delaware is the runaway winner in this competition.  More than half of 
the corporations listed for trading on the New York Stock Exchange and 
nearly sixty percent of the Fortune 500 corporations are incorporated in 
Delaware.1 
Those who believe that state competition results in a “race to the 
bottom” believe that Delaware’s corporate statute is skewed to favor the 
interests of corporate managers rather than those of investors.  As the story 
goes, because it is corporate managers who decide on the state of incor-
poration, Delaware caters to management, allowing them to exploit share-
holders.2 
An alternative view claims that state competition leads to a race to the 
top.3  According to this account, investors will not purchase, or at least not 
pay as much for, securities of firms incorporated in states that cater 
excessively to management.  Likewise, lenders will not lend to such firms 
without compensation for the risks posed by management’s lack of account-
ability.  As a result, those firms’ cost of capital will rise, while their 
earnings will fall.  Among other things, such firms thereby become more 
vulnerable to a hostile takeover and subsequent management purges.  
Corporate managers therefore have strong incentives to incorporate the 
 
*William D. Warren Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.  I thank William Chandler and 
William Klein for their thoughtful comments.  All remaining errors are my fault. 
1. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 16 (2002). 
2. See generally William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law:  Reflections Upon 
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 663 (1974) (providing a classic statement of the “race to the 
bottom” hypothesis). 
3. See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the 
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 254-58 (1977) (offering the seminal response to Cary).  
There is a third view, which is that most states do not compete for chartering revenues, leaving the 
field to Delaware.  See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Does Delaware Compete? (Dec. 12, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1315342. 
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business in a state offering rules preferred by investors and, as a result, 
competition for corporate charters should lead to statutes that maximize 
shareholder wealth. 
Although the empirical evidence is highly contested, there are good 
reasons to believe that the race is to the top rather than the bottom.  Roberta 
Romano’s event study of corporations’ changing their domicile by reincor-
porating in Delaware, for example, found that such firms experienced sta-
tistically significant positive cumulative abnormal returns.4  In other words, 
reincorporating in Delaware increased shareholder wealth.  This finding 
strongly supports the race to the top hypothesis.  If shareholders thought 
that Delaware was winning a race to the bottom, shareholders should dump 
the stock of firms that reincorporate in Delaware, driving down the stock 
price of such firms.  As Romano found, and all of the other major event 
studies confirm, there is a positive stock price effect upon reincorporation 
in Delaware.5 
The event study findings are buttressed by a well-known study by 
Robert Daines in which he compared the Tobin’s Q of Delaware and non-
Delaware corporations.6  Daines found that Delaware corporations in the 
period 1981-1996 had a higher Tobin’s Q than those of non-Delaware cor-
porations, suggesting that Delaware law increases shareholder wealth.7  
Although subsequent research suggests that this effect may not hold for all 
periods, Daines’ study remains an important confirmation of the event study 
data. 
Additional support for the event study findings is provided by takeover 
regulation.  Compared to most states, which have adopted multiple antitake-
over statutes of ever-increasing ferocity, Delaware’s single takeover statute 
is relatively friendly to hostile bidders.  An empirical study of state corpora-
tion codes by John Coates confirms that the Delaware statute is the least 
restrictive and imposes the least delay on a hostile bidder.8  Given the clear 
evidence that hostile takeovers increase shareholder wealth,9 this finding is 
 
4. Roberta Romano, Law as a Product:  Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L. 
ECON. & ORG. 225, passim (1985). 
5. See generally ROBERTA ROMANO, THE ADVANTAGE OF COMPETITIVE FEDERALISM FOR 
SECURITIES REGULATION 64-73 (2002) (discussing the relevant studies and criticisms thereof). 
6. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of a firm’s market value to its book value and is a widely accepted 
measure of firm value. 
7. Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525, 525 
(2001). 
8. John C. Coates IV, An Index of the Contestability of Corporate Control:  Studying 
Variation in Takeover Vulnerability (June 1999) (working paper, on file with the author). 
9. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 612-14. 
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especially striking.  Delaware thus turns out to be quite takeover-friendly 
and, by implication, shareholder-friendly. 
In 2007, North Dakota threw down the gauntlet to Delaware by 
adopting the Publicly Traded Corporations Act, which “is designed to 
strengthen corporate democracy and improve the performance of publicly 
traded corporations.”10  It is specifically designed to give shareholders 
greater rights and to reflect “the best thinking of institutional investors and 
governance experts.”11  The idea, presumably, is that North Dakota will 
attract incorporations away from Delaware by being more shareholder-
friendly than Delaware. 
I am confident in predicting that the North Dakota experiment will fail.  
First, the Act does nothing to address Delaware’s other advantages.  There 
is a considerable body of case law interpreting the Delaware corporate 
statute (DGCL), which allows legal questions to be answered with confi-
dence.  Delaware has a separate court, the Court of Chancery, devoted 
largely to corporate law cases.  The Chancellors have great expertise in 
corporate law matters, making their court a highly sophisticated forum for 
resolving disputes.  They also tend to render decisions quite quickly; facili-
tating transactions that are often sensitive.12  At least in the near term, North 
Dakota cannot replicate these advantages. 
Second, turning to the statutes, North Dakota inevitably loses whether 
state competition is a race to the top or to the bottom.  If state competition is 
a race to the bottom, which Delaware wins by catering to management 
interests at the expense of shareholders, the managers who control the 
incorporation decision will continue to choose Delaware.  Incorporation in 
North Dakota would limit managers’ ability to extract private rents, so they 
have no incentive to do so. 
If state competition is a race to the top, the position I believe both 
theory and the empirical evidence supports, North Dakota will still lose.  
Corporate law in almost all states places sharp limits on shareholder 
 
10. NORTH DAKOTA CORPORATE GOVERNANCE COUNCIL, EXPLANATION OF THE NORTH 
DAKOTA PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS ACT 1 (2007), http://ndcgc.org/Reference/Explain 
405.pdf.  The Act also offers a franchise tax rate fifty percent of that imposed on public corpo-
rations by Delaware.  Id. 
11. North Dakota Corporate Governance Council Homepage, http://ndcgc.org/ (last visited 
Mar. 27, 2009). 
12. Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate 
Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1077 (2000). 
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involvement in corporate decision-making.13  Taken together, these myriad 
rules form a regime I have called “director primacy.”14 
The director primacy account of corporate governance begins with the 
observation that the size and complexity of the public corporation ensures 
that stakeholders face significant collective action problems in making deci-
sions, suffer from intractable information asymmetries, and have differing 
interests.15  Under such conditions, consensus-based decision-making struc-
tures are likely to fail.  Instead, it is cheaper and more convenient to assign 
the decision-making function to a central decision maker wielding the 
power to rewrite intra-corporate contracts by fiat. 
The analysis to this point, of course, suggests only that the decision-
making structure should be one based on authority rather than participatory 
democracy.  Yet, it turns out that corporate law also was wise to assign 
ultimate decision-making authority to a group—i.e., the board of direc-
tors—rather than a single individual.  Groups have significant advantages 
vis-à-vis individuals at exercising critical evaluative judgment, which is 
precisely the skill set principally needed at the top of the corporate 
hierarchy.  In addition, groups solve the problem of “who watches the 
watchers” by placing a self-monitoring body at the apex of the corporate 
hierarchy.  The chief economic virtue of the public corporation thus is that 
it provides a hierarchical decision-making structure well suited to the 
problem of operating a large business enterprise with numerous employees, 
managers, shareholders, creditors, and other inputs.  In turn, it is the separa-
tion of ownership and control that makes this structure viable. 
While it is true that “Delaware has not explicitly embraced director 
primacy, the relevant statutory provisions and the [case law] have largely 
intimated that directors retain authority and need not passively allow either 
exogenous events or shareholder action to determine corporate decision-
making.”16  In contrast, North Dakota’s statute displaces this efficient and 
long-established system of director primacy in favor of shareholder 
primacy.  Yet, if the race to the top account is to be believed, shareholders 
prefer director primacy to shareholder primacy. 
 
13. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 1, at 512-14 (discussing “a host of other rules that indirectly 
prevent shareholders from exercising significant influence over corporate decision-making”). 
14. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy:  The Means and Ends of Corporate 
Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, passim 547 (2003) (setting out director primacy model). 
15. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND 
PRACTICE 23-104 (2008). 
16. Harry G. Hutchison, Director Primacy and Corporate Governance: Shareholder Voting 
Rights Captured by the Accountability/Authority Paradigm, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1111, 1194 
(2005). 
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Pointing out that the “mechanism by which stocks are valued ensures 
that the price reflects the terms of governance and operation,”17 Frank 
Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel posit a logical negative inference to be 
drawn from the race to the top account: 
Although agency costs are high, many managerial teams are 
scrupulously dedicated to investors’ interests. . . .  By increasing 
the value of the firm, they would do themselves a favor (most 
managers’ compensation is linked to the stock market, and they 
own stock too).  Nonexistence of securities said to be beneficial to 
investors is telling.18 
By the same token, if investors valued the rights North Dakota confers 
upon them, we would expect to observe entrepreneurs taking a company 
public to offer such rights either through appropriate provisions in the 
firm’s organic documents—which has always been possible in Delaware—
or by lobbying the Delaware Legislature to provide such rights off the rack 
in the corporation code.  Because we observe neither, we may conclude 
investors do not value these rights.19 
In sum, if investors valued the provisions of the North Dakota Act, 
Delaware would have gotten there first.  When the North Dakota share-
holder primacy statute fails in the market for corporate charters, we will 
have one more piece of evidence that investors prefer director primacy. 
 
 
17. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 18 (1991). 
18. Id. at 205. 
19. Note that my argument differs from The Economist’s observation that, if the North 
Dakota statute is successful, “Delaware is highly likely to respond with reforms of its own.  
Experience suggests that Delaware understands very well the cost of losing its edge in this lucra-
tive business.”  Anywhere but Delaware, THE ECON., April 17, 2007, available at http://www. 
economist.com/business/displaystory.cfm?story_id=E1_JDNRQNG.  My point is that, if the pro-
visions of the North Dakota statute were preferred by investors, Delaware would have already 
adopted them.  If I am wrong and The Economist is right, moreover, the North Dakota statute will 
still fail to prevail in the market for corporate charters. 
